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Abstract
The Decentralized-Consistent-Scale (DCS) Triangle defines three
dimensions that illustrate the tradeoffs of the blockchain consensus
mechanism. In this paper, we propose a new hybrid consensus pro-
tocol, called Deterministic Proof of Work (DPoW), which can reach
high levels of scalability and consistency without significant reduction
to decentralization. Our protocol introduces a Map-reduce PoW min-
ing algorithm to perform alongside Practical Byzantine Fault Toler-
ance (PBFT) verification, which together allow for transactions to be
confirmed immediately, largely improving scalability. In addition, the
protocol is designed such that forking cannot occur, ensuring strong
consistency and security against a multitude of attacks. The Map-
reduce PoW mining process ensures that no single entity can control
the network, guaranteeing decentralization. We analyzed the secu-
rity of our protocol by evaluating the possibility of double spending
attacks, and furthermore, conducted experiments which demonstrate
our claims.
1 Introduction
For years, blockchain systems have struggled to optimize the Decentralized-
Consistent-Scale (DCS) Triangle [1] of the consensus mechanism. Specifi-
cally, out of decentralization, consistency, and scalability, only two can be
achieved while sacrificing the third . Proof of Work (PoW) is used to achieve
high levels of decentralization and consistency [2] while suffering severe scal-
ability issues. Delegated Proof of Stake (DPoS) [3] and Practical Byzantine
Fault Tolerance (PBFT) [4], on the other hand, are used to achieve high
levels of consistency and scalability at the cost of the reduction of decentral-
ization.
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The concept of the PoW protocol was first detailed by Cynthia Dwork
and Moni Naor [5] in 1993, and in 1999, Markus Jakobsson [2] described the
utilization of this protocol to produce a piece of data, termed the “Proof of
Work," that is controllably difficult to create but simple to verify. Producing
a proof of work can be a random process with low probability of success
such that extensive trial and error is required before a valid proof of work is
generated. Proof of work is used in Bitcoin for block generation through the
process of "mining", and the security of the network depends upon it [6].
Currently, Bitcoin [7] operates at a rate of roughly 3 to 7 transactions
per second, while Ethereum operates at approximately 7 to 15 per second.
These rates are sub-optimal for the size of their growing userbases. This
slow transaction rate bottleneck occurs due to three factors. Firstly, trans-
actions require an extended period of time before they can be confirmed. In
a PoW based blockchain, the confirmation of a transaction can be quantized
by the number of blocks that follow the block it is contained in. Additionally,
attacks such as the Finney attack, race attack, and 51% attack mean trans-
actions with little or no confirmations are vulnerable to reversal with little
cost to the attacker. Due to this, the system is designed such that the more
confirmations a transaction gets, the harder it becomes to reverse, while also
increasing confirmation time, especially for transactions of large amounts.
Block generation time must also be controlled to be long enough such that
the process cannot occur too quickly and risk loss of consistency, thus fur-
ther lowering transaction rates. Decreasing the block generation time will
increase the chance of forks, thereby increasing the risk of alternative his-
tory attacks, which may result in double spending. Finally, the block spread
rate is linearly related to the size of the block, thus incentivizing miners to
generate small blocks in order to gain the advantage in the proof of work
competition.
The PoW protocol is also criticized for causing excessive waste of energy,
which is primarily a result of the needless repeated calculations performed
by every node. Specifically, each node must do the exact same calculation
process as every other node to solve for the PoW of each block [8]. In our
protocol, we avoid this unnecessary repetition by dividing the work among
nodes, thus reducing overall calculation times and power consumption.
This paper is principally concerned with the improvement of the blockchain
consensus mechanism, which is vital for improving the overall performance
of a blockchain. Here we propose a new protocol, called “Deterministic Proof
of Work (DPoW), which is characterized by separating the consensus pro-
cess into a puzzle solving step and a verification step. This two step process
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combines the advantages of both PoW and PBFT, and works as follows:
Firstly, during each block generation round, miners perform the puzzle
solving step to generate new blocks. We propose a Map-reduce PoW algo-
rithm that optimizes energy consumption through a process called “shard-
ing,” which essentially divides PoW calculations between nodes such that
nodes do not need to individually process the entirety of the searching space.
By separating the searching space into multiple “shards” and distributing the
work to miners, each node only finds a proof of work for their small portion
of the searching space, ensuring that nodes have very little chance of unnec-
essary repeated work. As a result, the time to calculate the hash of a block is
decreased, which considerably reduces the total computations performed by
the entire network. Therefore, through this method, we can increase the scal-
ability of a blockchain while maintaining decentralization and consistency.
Our experiments show that integrating Map-reduce PoW directly results in
a significant improvement in the PoW solving time per block.
In the following verification step, newly generated blocks are sent to an
elected verifier group during each block generating time. The verifier group
then performs the PBFT consensus protocol on the blocks, which will in
turn decide upon a single valid block to be appended to the chain. Lamport
states that in distributed fault-tolerance systems, the maximum tolerance
threshold of faulty members is 1/3 [9] of the total members. Experimentally,
we confirmed that our protocol does indeed support this conclusion.
Due to the deterministic finality of our Deterministic Proof of Work pro-
tocol, we can ensure that upon a block’s validation, it immediately becomes
irreversible in the blockchain history. This means that there is no limit to
the speed of block production, unlike the original PoW protocol. This is
possible because our system is designed such that forks cannot develop, and
thus there only ever exists a single chain in the entire network. By coupling
both consensus mechanisms, a blockchain can have increased scalability as
consensus no longer depends on a race of computing power and transactions
can be validated much faster. Transaction validation times can be reduced
to mere seconds compared to the hours required for bitcoin to accomplish
the same task. This also retains a high level of consistency through the
implementation of a verifier group via PBFT. Finally, it can perform these
steps without significant reduction to decentralization as the block genera-
tion process remains uncontrolled by any central authority.
In summary, we make the following contributions:
1. We construct a new consensus algorithm which is a hybrid of the PoW
and PBFT consensus mechanisms.
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2. We propose a map-reduce mining protocol.
3. We modify the PBFT algorithm to fit in our consensus protocol.
4. We prove the security of our hybrid protocol against double spending
attacks.
5. We provide experimental data which measures the efficiency and secu-
rity of our consensus algorithm.
2 Bitcoin Blockchain Consensus Protocol: Proof of
Work
The underlying database structure for transactions in Bitcoin and many
other digital cryptocurrencies is a decentralized ledger. This ledger is main-
tained by anonymous parties, called “miners,” who execute a consensus pro-
tocol that maintains a data structure called the blockchain. A blockchain is
a linked list of blocks, with each block containing the hash of the previous
block in the chain. Transactions are bundled into each of these blocks. All
full nodes in the network have their own copy of the blockchain in order to
maintain the security of the system. The Bitcoin protocol requires that a
valid “proof of work” must be provided for each new generated block for it to
be appended to the chain. A proof of work is the solution to a cryptographic
puzzle which contains the previous block hash, the Merkle root [10] of the
valid transactions in the current block, and a special transaction called a
coinbase which rewards the miner for solving the cryptographic puzzle. A
valid proof of work satisfies the following formula:
H (PreHash,Diff,Time,TxRoot,Nonce) ≤ Target. (1)
In this expression, H is a cryptographic hash function (SHA-256 in bit-
coin, SHA-3 in our paper), Target is the max possible hash value which
makes the proof of work valid, PreHash is the hash of the previous block’s
header, Diff is the difficulty value which scales the Target within the hash
value range, Time is the UNIX timestamp, TxRoot is the Merkle root [10]
of all transactions contained in the block, and Nonce is an integer that can
be used to brute-force the hash inequality. The miner mines the block by
incrementing the nonce until a valid proof of work has been discovered. In
Fig. 1, we show how the proof of work is organized. Once the block is mined
successfully, the block cannot be changed without redoing the work due to
the second pre-image resistance of the cryptographic hash function [11].
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Figure 1: The cryptographic puzzle of Proof of Work
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Bitcoin uses the Hashcash proof of work system [5]. The original Bitcoin
proof of work algorithm is based on the SHA256 hash function which uses
the Merkle-Damgard construction, however, this function has the length-
extension weakness [12]. We suggest using the SHA3-Keccak256 hash func-
tion instead [13], as this hash function uses the sponge and duplex con-
struction, which is not sensitive to length-extension attacks, thus making
protocols that utilize it more robust.
We outline the procedure used by Bitcoin to generate a block with valid
proof of work in detail below:
1. Each miner collects the transactions into a memory pool separately.
When mining begins, miners pick transactions from the pool and use
them to generate a Merkle tree[14].
2. The miner generates a temporary block which has everything deter-
mined except the nonce. This temporary block consists of a header
and body. The header contains the previous block header hash, dif-
ficulty, transaction Merkle root (obtained in Step 1), and timestamp,
while the body contains the transaction list.
3. The miner will continuously put different nonces into the temporary
block and compute the hash of the block header until either he finds a
valid proof of work or the miner receives a new block from the network,
meaning another miner has already validated the current block. If the
miner finds a valid proof of work, he will broadcast the new block. If
the entire searching space of the nonce has been tried, the miner will
return to Step 1, modify the template by changing the transaction or
timestamp, and continue trying.
Fig 2 depicts a traditional Proof of Work procedure. We can see that
each miner is working separately from other miners. If they are working
in the same transaction list, there is a high probability of repeating work,
resulting in a waste of hash computing power. Moreover, multiple miners
create blocks with the same preceding block, resulting in several valid blocks
at the same height in the chain. PoW allows the possibility of forks, where
several different blockchains have the same length, yet no chain supersedes
other chains. Miners can choose blocks from any branch as their preced-
ing block. The Bitcoin protocol defines a regulation on which chain miners
should mine in order to resolve forks. The criterion is that only the longest
chain will be committed by the P2P network, as the longest chain signifies
it consumed the most mining power to generate. However, the Bitcoin con-
sensus protocol is not incentive-compatible; Eyal and Sirer [15] describe an
6
Figure 2: An overview of the original Proof of Work protocol. Miners work
individually and forks can occur if multiple miners solve the cryptographic
puzzle.
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attack, called selfish mining, in which colluding miners can obtain extra rev-
enue. This attack increases the size of the colluding group until it becomes
the majority. They propose one modification for the protocol to mitigate this
attack: when receiving competing branches of the same length, the miner
should broadcast all of the branches and pick one to mine randomly. Decker
and Wattenhofer [16] estimate that accidental bifurcation occurs on average
about once every 56 blocks. The faster blocks are produced, the higher the
chance that forks will form, which negatively impacts the consistency of the
chain.
In section 3 we propose a map-reduce mining mechanism to address the
problem of repeated work in PoW. Any miner can submit a valid block
by broadcasting it to the peer to peer (P2P) network, then other miners
verify its validity, and if it is valid, they will commit it. In section 4, we
introduced a PBFT verification step after map-reduce mining, which aims
to solve the consistency problem of the original PoW by disallowing forking
through providing deterministic finality, instead of the probabilistic finality
used by PoW. An overview of the DPoW protocol is illustrated in Fig 3.
3 Map-Reduce Proof of Work
The original proof of work mining mechanism requires all miner to brute-
force the cryptographic puzzle individually. This high amount of work repe-
tition results in a major loss in efficiency. In order to improve the efficiency
of this process, we design a map-reduce proof of work procedure. Let us
first introduce a new type of node called a “sharding server.” In the original
proof of work mining system, miners have two major tasks. First, they must
construct a temporary block as the input for mining. Second, they attempt
to fill the nonce in the temporary block to check if it is valid. In our proce-
dure, we let the sharding server build the temporary block from the memory
pool and miners will only need to find the nonce for the specified temporary
block. The necessary steps are described in detail below:
1. The sharding server will map the entire searching space into several
shards using a non-overlapping method, then distribute the individual
shards to the miner nodes working for it.
2. The miner nodes will work in their searching shards and attempt to
obtain the proof of work. The miner should also frequently listen to the
sharding server within a reasonable interval of time for new updated
shards. If the miner obtains the proof of work, he will submit it to the
sharding server.
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Figure 3: An overview of the Deterministic Proof of Work protocol. Miners
are grouped by sharding servers. Sharding servers solve the cryptographic
puzzle and broadcast the block to a verifier group. Only one block can be
verified and broadcasted to the P2P network at a time.
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3. The sharding server will then submit the proof of work and wait for
verification.
In Algorithm 1, we present the pseudocode of the Map-reduce PoW al-
gorithm.
Algorithm 1 Map Reduce PoW
1: master.start()
2: worker.start()
3: master.register(worker) . notify master about the worker
4: master.dispatch(work) . distribute shards to worker
5: notFound = true . miner starts mining
6: while notFound do
7: worker.change(coinbase) . worker changes coinbase data to make a
trial
8: pass← worker.seal() . worker computes hash and returns true on
success
9: if pass = true then
10: notFound← false
11: end if
12: end while
13: worker.submit(work) . worker submits proof of work to master
14: pass← master.check(work) . master verifies proof of work
15: if pass = true then
16: master.broadcast(block) . master broadcasts the valid block
17: end if
The challenge lies in how to design the mapping algorithm to avoid over-
laps. The nonce is normally 4 bytes (or 32 bits), which means the searching
space contains 232 possible nonces. Most miners can cover this space in sec-
onds, thus we cannot simply split the entire range of nonces. We designed
a method to map the searching space into separate non-overlapping spaces
through the coinbase transaction. The sharding server will listen to the P2P
network and package the transaction, however, it will not generate the en-
tire transactions’ Merkle tree. Instead, it will create the Merkle branch of
the coinbase transaction. Then the sharding server will distribute the previ-
ous block header hash, difficulty, timestamp, Merkle branch of the coinbase
transaction, and the receiver address of the coinbase transaction to miners.
Nonces are not distributed. The sharding server will then wait for responses
from the miner servers. It will not wait endlessly, and will instead map new
shards and distribute them in the condition that no miner submits a proof of
work in a certain period, or another sharding server obtains a verified proof
10
of work first.
The miner gets a distributed shard from the sharding server and then
works on this shard, then the miner will produce the coinbase transaction by
concatenating the extra data and the address of the coinbase transaction’s
receiver, provided by the sharding server. This extra data will use the miner’s
unique ID (for example, their bitcoin address) as a prefix, followed by any
extra byte array. After the miner produces the coinbase transaction, he can
use it to generate the transaction root hash using the Merkle branch given
by the sharding server. The miner will then attempt to adjust the nonce to
get a valid proof of work. If the miner is unsuccessful in their attempt, he
can adjust the extra data and generate a new coinbase transaction until he
is successful. Once the coinbase is generated, the entire searching space is
modified, and the miner can then try the nonce in this new searching space.
Since each miner has a different unique ID, and since the extra data begins
with their ID, the extra data will not overlap with other miners, thus we
can expect that the Merkle root search by different miners will have a very
minimal probability of collision.
The collision probability can be analyzed through the birthday model.
Suppose there are m people and N days per year. We can use P (m,N) to
denote the probability that there are at least two people with same birthday,
as described in Equation 2.
P (m,N) = 1− N !
(N −m)! ·Nm = 1−
m−1∏
i=1
(1− i
N
)
≥ 1−
m−1∏
i=1
e−
i
N = 1− e−m(m−1)2N .
(2)
In our model, we can set p(m) as the probability that a collision happens
given m different coinbase messages. Since the hash function’s output length
is 256 bits, there are 2256 different possible outputs. We can treat the collision
event as if there are at least two people (miners) having the same birthday
(a collision), where N is 2256. This probability estimation is represented in
Equation 3.
p(m) ≥ 1− exp(−1
2
· m
2
2256
) ≈ 1
2
· ( m
2128
)2. (3)
The values of m and their lower bounds of collision probability are displayed
in Table 1.
From Table 1, we can see that it will take 2128 trials before the chance
that some pair of miners have a hash collision becomes at least 50%, thus
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Table 1: The relationship between collision probability and number of trials.
m 216 232 264 296 2127 2128
p(m) 2−225 2−193 2−129 2−65 0.125 0.5
the chance of having a collision is negligible. Thus, if each miner uses a
unique ID as their coinbase extra data prefix, their Merkle root will have
little chance of overlap, and thus neither will their searching space.
The blockchain will only reward the sharding server node through coin-
base transaction. In order to incentivize miners, the sharding server must
distribute the reward using an appropriate method. This can be done either
in chain or off chain, however, the details of this system will not be dis-
cussed in this paper as it is not a major concern of the main chain consensus
protocol.
Once the sharding server obtains a valid proof of work, it will broadcast
the valid block to a randomly selected verifier group and wait for verification.
If the block gets verified, all nodes in the P2P network can then replicate
their local state machine based on this block. The verification process will
be detailed in the next section.
4 Byzantine Fault Tolerance Verification
In the last section, we proposed the Map-reduce PoW mining algorithm to
generate a valid candidate block. After the sharding server generates the
candidate block, the server must submit it to a verifier group and await ver-
ification. When the candidate block is received by the verifier group, they
will run a Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT) protocol to ensure
the consistency and correctness of the verification result in asynchronous
environments [4]. The verifier group is elected through a verifiable random
function (VRF) [17] and the result is recorded in the main chain periodically.
The election procedure will not be covered in this paper. The verifier group
will verify a certain amount of blocks before it is replaced by a new elected
verifier group. The timeframe within which each chosen verifier group per-
forms all of its tasks is called one period, and the timeframe within which a
single block verification procedure is conducted is called a round. For every
round, each verifier in the group takes turns becoming the chosen primary
verifier. This primary verifier initializes the verification protocol and also
picks one block among the valid block candidates received from different
sharding servers. Then, the primary verifier proposes this block to the rest
of the verifier group, who will then execute the PBFT protocol on the block.
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The original PBFT protocol [18] requires some modification in order to
be adapted for our system. The verification protocol procedure contains
four steps, shown in Figure 4. In a normal case, the protocol begins with the
"propose" stage. Through the "prevote" and "precommit" stages, verfiers
vote and reach consensus on either a proposed block or an empty block.
After this stage, they undergo the "commit" stage where the verified block is
broadcast to the rest of the network. The blockchain height is thus increased
with the addition of the new block and consensus continues into a new cycle
of block selection and verification. If any errors occur, such as in the case
that the primary verifier proposes an invalid block, consensus will follow
the red path shown in Figure 4, skip the commit stage (thus leaving the
blockchain height unchanged), and enter a new round of consensus.
Figure 4: DPoW adapted Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance.
The top-level procedure that implements PBFT is shown in Algorithm 2.
This procedure takes in a context, ctx, which captures the current state of
the blockchain. The procedure will initialize the height and round < h, r >
as < chainheight + 1, 0 >, and will set the lockedBlock to "empty," then
begin the consensus loop. The stages of the verification process are detailed
as follows.
1. "Propose." The Propose() function is first called by verifiers. The
13
verifiers first wait for a block proposal by the primary verifier. If the
lockedBlock is not empty, the proposer proposes this locked block.
Otherwise, the proposer collects a new mined blocks from sharding
servers within a reasonable time period. The first valid block is then
chosen and a block proposal is generated containing the height, round,
proposed block, and signature. The primary verifier then generates the
signature, fills the proposal, and broadcasts it to other verifiers. Upon
receiving the block proposal, verifiers must first check if the signature
is valid by checking if it was indeed produced by the primary verifier.
Furthermore they need to verify if the block itself is valid. If is invalid,
or no proposal was received upon time out, they will instead default
on an empty block proposal.
2. "Prevote." Each verifier obtains a valid or empty proposal from the first
stage. A vote for that proposed block hash or empty block hash is then
generated and broadcasted to the group. While this occurs, verifiers
also collect the votes received from other verifiers. This procedure is
responsible for ensuring vote validity by checking height, round, and
signature. Finally, a vote count is performed, and the block hash which
obtains more than 2/3 of votes is chosen and returned. If there is no
consensus on a hash, meaning no hash surpassed the threshold amount
of votes, an empty block hash will be returned instead.
3. "Precommit." In this stage, verifiers broadcast their precommit vote to
the hash returned by the "Prevote" stage. A vote count is performed
once again, and if more than 2/3 of precommit votes are received for
a block hash, the hash is returned, otherwise the empty block hash is
returned.
4. "Commit." If the block hash returned by the "Precommit" stage is not
empty, it must be equal to H(lockedBlock). The lockedBlock is then
committed and the height, round, and lockedBlock is updated. If the
blockHash instead represents an empty block, then simply increment
the round by 1 and continue.
It is crucial to ensure that consensus is reached on only one valid block
for each blockchain height. It is possible to have two different blocks become
verified at any given height, in the case that some verifiers support both
block A and block B in two different rounds. Take for example if there are
four verifiers: A, B, C, and D. A has the votes for Block X from A, B, and C
and thus commits Block X. If A’s vote is not received by the rest of the group
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in time due to a network delay, then B, C, and D only receive B and C’s
votes on Block X and enter a new round. B, C, and D then reach consensus
on some block Y instead. As a result, both Block X and Y appear as valid to
the network. To avoid this problem, when a user observes more than a 2/3
majority vote on a block in the Prevote stage, the user will lock this block
and precommit it. If this block is not commited in this round, such as in
the case of verifier B and C, they will begin a new round. If B or C becomes
the primary verifier, they will then re-propose Block X in order to ensure
the group reaches consensus on the same block as A. If instead verifier D
becomes the primary verifier, a new Block Y is proposed, however, B and C
will stick to Block X and instead vote on an empty block hash to be safe.
Algorithm 2 Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerant
1: procedure consensus(ctx)
2: h← ctx.height+ 1 . start from the next block in the chain
3: r ← 0
4: empty ← nil
5: lockedBlock ← empty
6: while r < MaxStep do . if r=MaxStep, assume network problem
7: proposeBlock ← Propose(ctx, h, r, lockedBlock)
8: lockedBlock ← Prevote(ctx, h, r,H(proposeBlock))
9: blockHash← Precommit(ctx, h, r, lockedBlock)
10: if blockHash = H(lockedBlock) then
11: Commit(ctx, lockedBlock) . consensus reached
12: h+ +
13: r ← 0
14: lockedBlock ← empty
15: else . no consensus reached in this round
16: r + + . start a new round
17: end if
18: end while
19: end procedure
5 Security Discussion
In this section we will analyze the security of our protocol. Suppose there
are in total N parties in our network. Among these parties, there are T
parties controlled by the attacker. In order to simplify the security model,
we assume all parties have the same hash computing power. If one party has
twice the hash computing power of other parties, we can simply treat it as
two parties. We evaluate the possibility that the attacker can successfully
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deploy a double spending attack.
Lemma 5.1. The PBFT verification step can commit a proposal if more
than 2/3 of all verifiers are in agreement.
Proof. See [18] for details.
Theorem 5.1. Assuming an honest majority, the Deterministic Proof of
Work scheme is secure against double spending attacks.
Proof. We first observe how an attacker can deploy a double spending attack
[19]. First, the attacker must corrupt and control more than 2/3 of the
verifier group from Lemma 5.1. This lies in the fact that honest verifiers will
never sign a block with the same height twice, thus the attacker must ensure
more than 2/3 of verifiers will sign whatever block the attacker chooses. Then
in the second step, the attacker must gain enough hash computing power to
suppress an old verified block. If both of these tasks can be achieved, then
the attacker can send their transaction and get what he requires from the
receiver. Once this has occurred, the attacker can then attempt to generate
another block with the same height as the block that must be suppressed,
and then ensure that it can be verified by the verifier group. If the new block
suppresses the old block and is successfully committed to the P2P network,
a double spending attack will have been successfully conducted. We can now
analyze this attack’s probability of success in our protocol. We denote this
probability as Patt.
First, we calculate the probability that more than 2/3 of verifiers are
from an attacking party. Suppose the total number of verifiers is M . Let
Xi be the random variable equal to 1 if the i-th verifier is from an attacking
party and 0 otherwise. Since the verifier is randomly chosen from the total
parties, it is easy to see that Xi is a Bernoulli random variable. We have
that P (Xi = 1) = TN and P (Xi = 0) =
N−T
N . Let X =
M∑
i=1
Xi. We can
see that X follows a binomial distribution with parameters ( TN ,M). Using
multiplicative Chernoff bound, we have P (X ≥ (1+δ)MTN ) ≤ e−
δ2MT
N
3 for
any 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 and P (X ≥ (1+δ)MTN ) ≤ e−
δMT
N
3 for any δ ≥ 1. We
denote the probability P (X ≥ [2M3 ]) as Pf . This is the probability that
the PBFT verification step become insecure. Set δ = 2N3T − 1, we have that
Pf ≤ e−
( 2N3T −1)
2MT
N
3 for 13N ≤ T ≤ 23N and Pf ≤ e−
( 2N3T −1)MTN
3 for T < 13N .
Now we assume that the attacker already controls more than 1/3 of
verifiers in the verifier group. What the attacker must do next is to suppress
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the verified block. We denote the probability of the attacker’s success in
this step as Ps. The race between the honest majority and attacker can
be characterized as a Binomial Random Walk. From [7], we know that the
probability of an attacker catching up is analogous to a Gambler’s Ruin
problem. Thus, we have:
1. Probability an honest node finds the block is N−TN
2. Probability the attacker finds the block is TN
3. Probability the attacker can catch up from z blocks behind is{
1, T ≥ N2
( TN−T )
z
, T < N2
}
Now suppose the attacker begins mining a secret block immediately after
his transaction is committed to a block B, and the attacker get what he wants
z blocks after block B. Then, the length of the secret chain of the attacker
will be a Poisson distribution with expected value λ TN−T . For simplicity, we
assume the period of the verification is longer than z, meaning that we do not
need to account for a change to the verifier group. Otherwise, the attacker
must corrupt the verifier group in a successive period, which increases the
difficulty of the attack.
Now suppose the length of the secret chain is k blocks. We will deal with
it in two cases. In the first case, given that TN <
1
2 , if k ≤ z, the number
of blocks that the attacker must catch up with is z − k, thus the proba-
bility that he can catch up is given by ( TN−T )
z. Otherwise, the probability
that the attacker can catch up is 1 since his secret chain is already longer.
Accumulating the probability for each k, we obtain:
ps =
z∑
k=0
λke−λ
k!
·
(
T
N − T
)(z−k)
+
∞∑
k=z
λke−λ
k!
=1−
z∑
k=0
λke−λ
k!
·
(
1−
(
T
N − T
)(z−k))
,
(4)
In the second case, when 12 ≤ TN < 23 , the attacker has more than 50% of
hash computing power. Similarly we find Ps = 1.
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Now we can obtain the probability Patt as follows:
Patt=Pf · Ps
≤

e−
( 2N3T −1)
2MT
N
3 , 12 ≤ TN ≤ 23(
1−
z∑
k=0
λke−λ
k! ·
(
1−
(
T
N−T
)(z−k))) · e−( 2N3T −1)2MTN3 , 13 ≤ TN < 12(
1−
z∑
k=0
λke−λ
k! ·
(
1−
(
T
N−T
)(z−k))) · e−( 2N3T −1)MTN3 , TN ≤ 13
(5)
From Inequality 5, we can observe that even if the attacker controls more
than 50% of hash computing power, the success of a double spending attack
is still not guaranteed. If the attacker wishes to successfully deploy the
double spending attack with 100% probability of success, he must have at
least 2/3 of total hash power. Furthermore, in the case that the attacker
controls less than 50% of hash computing power, the success probability of
such an attack in our protocol is still lower than that of the original PoW
algorithm given in [7], which proves that our protocol is more secure.
6 Experiment
In this section, we conducted experiments to demonstrate the performance
and security of our consensus protocol. We implement our protocol using
the Go language.
First, we tested the efficiency of Map-reduce PoW by creating two groups
to mine for the proof of work given the same hash puzzle by having them
work on the same temporary block. In Group 1 (without sharding), we
used 7 sharding servers with each server relying on a single miner. Each
miner solved the puzzle for the entire searching space, which is similar to the
original PoW scheme. In Group 2 (with sharding), we used 1 sharding server
with 7 miners working for it simultaneously. For each group, we recorded the
time taken to generate a valid proof of work using the same hash difficulty.
We randomized the level of difficulty for each trial and ran the experiments
on 1000 hash puzzles.
In Fig. 5, the times taken to generate the proof of work for all 1000 hash
puzzles are shown in the scatter plot. As expected, we can see that the group
with sharding was much faster in comparison to the group without sharding,
with only a single trial exceeding 30 seconds.
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In Fig. 6, we present a box plot of consensus times in both groups. The
distribution of time from the group with sharding has a much smaller spread
compared to the group without sharding. The interquartile range (IQR) of
consensus times for the group with sharding (1 to 8 seconds) was 3.7 times
smaller than the group without sharding (5 to 31 seconds). We observed an
average time of 5.37 seconds per puzzle with sharding compared to an average
of 21.62 seconds without sharding. We then removed the 191 observations
with consensus time 0 and log-transformed the remaining times to meet the
normality assumption. The Welch two sample t-test infers a significantly dif-
ferent mean consensus time between the two groups (t = −21.8, df = 1514.3,
p-value < 0.01**). The results suggest that our Map-reduce PoW protocol
ensures that block hash puzzles are successfully divided among miners such
that there is very minuscule overlap of work, thus allowing a much larger
searching space per second with decreased computation power compared to
the original PoW protocol in which many overlaps result in slow and inef-
ficient computation. Additionally in our protocol, while holding difficulty
constant, as the number of miners solving a hash puzzle increases, the more
distributed the work becomes, and thus the time to calculate each puzzle
decreases.
Figure 5: Scatter plot comparing times taken to generate the work per puzzle
with and without sharding.
Next, we conducted an experiment to test the PBFT verification protocol.
We set up the experiment by creating six groups. A valid block was assigned
to Group A1, A2, and A3, and an invalid block was assigned to Group
B1, B2, and B3. Each group consisted of 4 verifiers that were either good
(meaning they can always validate a block correctly) or bad (meaning they
may validate a block incorrectly). Group A1 and B1 each contained 1 bad
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Figure 6: Box plot comparing distributions of consensus times with and
without sharding.
verifier and 3 good verifiers. Group A2 and B2 each contained 2 bad verifiers
and 2 good verifiers. Group A3 and B3 each contained 3 bad verifiers and 1
good verifier. This setup establishes that Group A1 and B1 have less than
1/3 bad verifiers, Group A2 and B2 have between 1/3 and 2/3 bad verifiers,
and Group A3 and B3 have more than 2/3 bad verifiers.
In the experiment, we assumed bad verifiers could conspire together to al-
ter the validation process. We then ran the experiment and recorded whether
the groups marked blocks as valid (V), or invalid (I). This procedure was then
run 10 times for each group. The results of this experiment were recorded
in Table 2.
Table 2: Block validation results for valid (V) and invalid (I) block trials
given different amounts of bad verifiers.
Trial 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Group A1 V V V V V V V V V V
Group A2 V I V V I I V V V I
Group A3 I I I I I I I I I I
Group B1 I I I I I I I I I I
Group B2 I I I I I I I I I I
Group B3 V V V V V V V V V V
We can see from the table that in Group A1 and B1, every block was
successfully identified as valid and invalid respectively. In Group A2, given
only valid blocks, the results were mixed, indicating that the group may not
achieve consensus. In Group B2, given only invalid blocks, it successfully
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identified every block as invalid. In Group A3 and B3, we see that since the
bad verifiers could conspire together and can control the verification process,
they were able to force a false validation to be accepted every time.
We can confirm from these results that, given a group of verifiers, if
there are less than 1/3 bad verifiers, all blocks that are processed by the
verifier group will be verified correctly. If there are between 1/3 and 2/3
bad verifiers, invalid blocks submitted to the group will always be correctly
identified, however, the group may not be able to achieve consensus on valid
blocks. Finally, if there are more than 2/3 of verifiers conspiring in the PBFT
protocol, invalid blocks submitted to the group could be falsely marked valid,
and vice versa for valid blocks. From this, we can infer that if a group consists
of more than 2/3 bad verifiers, these verifiers can control the verification
process.
7 Summary and Future Work
In this paper, we have described a Deterministic Proof-of-Work consensus
algorithm, which is a hybrid approach that presents a new Map-reduce PoW
mining algorithm and combines it with PBFT verification. We have ana-
lyzed the security model of this new consensus protocol and estimated the
probability of successful double spending attacks. Our protocol can success-
fully resist 51% attacks and also increase this threshold to 66.6%. We also
demonstrated that our protocol can achieve greater security and consistency
while keeping high level decentralization through our two experiments.
It is quickly becoming evident that no pure consensus protocols can op-
timize the DCS triangle efficiently. For example, DPoS is criticized for its
decreased decentralization, the consistency of PoS is affected by the Nothing-
at-Stake problem, and the PoW protocol suffers from its major scalability
problem. Additionally, PBFT alone has network scalability problems that
result in it being used primarily for consortium chains. Compared to pure
consensus protocols, hybrid consensus protocols, such as ours, prove to be
far more capable of optimizing the DCS triangle while also providing forward
security and are more practical and efficient as a result.
There is still much work to do on improving our system.
Firstly, we can incorporate a reputation score in the verifier election
process, which can in turn raise the difficulty of controlling verifiers in the
verifier group, thus increasing security against attackers. This score can be
combined with the random seed to scale the probability for a candidate to
be elected as a verifier. More work needs to be conducted in regards to this
system in the future.
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The DPoW protocol can also utilize IBLT (Invertible Bloom Lookup
Tables) and a bloom filter [20] when broadcasting blocks within the P2P
network. This can improve the performance of the protocol by reducing the
network cost significantly when relaying blocks between nodes.
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